Philosophizing as a Source of Virtue (Aristotle &Plato)

 

In Republic, Socrates faces a very challenging question, so challenging that it requires him to construct a city where he explores what justice and virtue are in practice. The question is plain and devoid of any rhetoric deception: How could virtue be rewarding in the world where doing injustice, lying, and other misdeeds are more rewarding when they are well concealed. This is a very important question in defining virtue and answering why it carries vital importance. Aristotle views virtue as the ultimate instrument for leading a happy and fulfilled life, provided that virtue is rooted in rationality. Aristotle’s standpoint in what virtue resonates Socrates’ as they both portray virtue as either a source of pleasance or pleasure itself “virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant”. However, both notorious thinkers’ articulations on the benevolent and rewarding nature of virtue stumble upon an impasse that presents itself in the first book of Republic. The paradox is as follows; if someone is competent at guarding money, he is also competent at stealing it, thereby, the same logic may be applied to virtue depicting a virtuous person as an evil person. To be precise, ensuing the basis that virtue provides utmost pleasance, a person good at being virtuous should also be good at being evil which begets pain meaning that to strive for pleasure is to strive for pain. To address this dilemma Socrates puts forward his theory of self-control and takes self-control as the fundamental pillar for his conceptualization of virtue. This theory of self-control carries utmost importance as it ties the majority of Plato’s ideas and reinforces his stance on knowledge and the doctrine of recollection. 

The paradox Socrates draws in Republic establishes that to be good at a craft is the same as being bad at the said craft. The reflection of such logic on virtue implies that because virtue is the source of pleasure people who are good at attaining pleasure are also good at receiving pain, which is, at its core, counter-intuitive. Further, Socrates is not presenting this paradox to conduct his own argument, he rather constructs it to illustrate that good and evil are not woven into each other and evil is the absence of good, not the opposite of good. In a way, by fabricating such a paradox, Socrates is articulating and expanding on a possible counterargument to reinforce his own viewpoint about goodness does not derive from evilness. The debunking of the said paradox unveils the function of good, which is to provide good and pleasure, “So the function of a good person isn’t to harm, but that of his opposite”(336a Republic). He proves this by a comparison between dryness and wetness attributing dryness to good and wetness to evil. Such a portrait of both concepts underpins the corrupting nature of evil on which Socrates expands later in Republic, Protagoras, and Meno. Aristotle also views evil as a corrupting force. He suggests that “virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant”(1099a, The Nicomachean Ethics), and according to him they require external goods to subsist “Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment”(1099b The Nicomachean Ethics) Ultimately, the corruptive nature of evilness will deviate the individual from goodness displaying that a good person cannot be an evil person at the same time. To illustrate, while a guardian can be excellent at catching thieves, he may not be good at being a thief because if he were good at being a thief, he would be corrupted and couldn’t be a virtuous enough guardian to catch thieves. Thereof, the paradox Socrates puts forward is invalid when it is applied to goodness and virtue.

This, however, raises a question that begs to be answered? In a world where evil and corruption slither among us, how can a person be just and good? To put it differently, the dry agent will be wet when he is exposed to water, regardless of how dry the said agent previously was. Socrates would view this question through a utopic lens and reply to it by pointing out that change only occurs due to weakness. To elaborate, Socrates contemplates on whether gods can alter themselves and conclude that they cannot because they are strong and perfect, for people he claims that “So whatever is in good condition—whether due to nature or craft or both—is least subject to change by something else”(381b Republic). This suggests that the more an agent is virtuous the less likely he will be corrupted by evil. Aristotle would also present a similar argument by pointing that virtue requires practice and the more an individual practices virtue the stronger his virtue will be, decreasing the chance or the intensity of the corruption. 

 Socrates’ core reasoning rests on his theory of self-control with which he conveys that the combination of knowledge and true opinion sets the ground for the action of virtue. In Protagoras Socrates establishes that people always strive for pleasure and they averse to pain. However, in the process of constructing the argument, Socrates dwells on the reason why people sometimes choose lesser pleasure if they always pursue the most rewarding pleasure. To find the reason for such a dilemma Socrates returns to his previous contemplations on the function of knowledge and true opinion. He asserts that people should measure the pleasures and choose the most rewarding pleasure, and the only instrument for true consideration is knowledge. Also, Socrates establishes that “nothing” is “mightier than knowledge” and because of that knowledge “must prevail over pleasure” (357c Protacoras). In Meno Socrates suggests that people cannot learn anything, but they can only recall what their souls previously fathomed. To put these recollections in practice knowledge and true opinion should be woven into each other so that knowledge can tie down a true opinion, reinforcing the true opinion and making it more consistent “After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place”(98a Meno). This theory combined with his theory in Protagoras offers another reason for why a truly good person cannot be an evil person at the same time or why a good person may be evil. According to those theories, the fundamental pillar for self-control stems from the true opinion that is tied down with knowledge, and knowledge is always superior to pleasure. Thereby, a knowledgeable person will have self-control meaning he will always follow the most rewarding pleasure. However, there will be times where an individual will lack knowledge resulting in him choosing a pleasure that is closer/instantaneous but less gratifying. Ultimately this distinguishes the thief from the guardian. They both have true opinions but what they do depends on their knowledge that ties down their true opinion. Thereby, the question isn’t whether someone is competent enough to do something, it is whether he is knowledgeable enough to take the best action of course. 

In conclusion, Socrates constructs the paradox of thief and the guardian to distinguish good and evil. According to Aristotle, virtue paves the ultimate path for happiness and thereby is always rewarding. However, it requires external goods and is vulnerable to corruption. Both thinkers agree on the same consensus here, as Socrates also thinks poets could be corrupting since they fabricate stories that deceive people. Disaccord between both thinkers emerges when they meditate on the root of virtue. Socrates’ articulation on it suggests that virtue is a prerequisite for a guardian, thereby a guardian with a virtuous nature cannot be a thief regardless of his competence in the subject. Aristotle, on the other hand, suggests that the practice of virtue will instill virtue into people and facilitate the path for taking the true course of action. Lack of practice will, however, may drive the individual to be evil. This could also be applied to Socrates’ theory but practice ought to be replaced with knowledge, and according to Socrates, knowledge derives from questioning, philosophizing.

 

 

Works Citied

Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon, 1926, Internet Classics Archive, n.d. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.html. 

Plato. Plato's The Republic. New York :Books, Inc., 1943.

Plato, & Jowett, B. (2019). Five dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Inkflight.

Plato, Morel, P.-M., & Croiset, A. (2002). Protagoras. Les Belles lettres.